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THOMADAKIS, GOUNOPOULOS, NOUNIS, AND RIGINOS 
ATHENS STOCK EXCHANGE 
Innovation and upheaval: early growth in Greek capital market listings 
and IPOs from 1880 to the Second World War in the Athens Stock 
Exchange† 
STAVROS THOMADAKIS, DIMITRIOS GOUNOPOULOS, CHRISTOS NOUNIS, and MICHALIS RIGINOS* 
The establishment and growth of the Greek stock market were coincident with development episodes, financial upheavals, 
and geographic expansions of the country’s economy over the period 1880–1940. This article explores the growth of the 
Athens Stock Exchange through new listings and initial public offerings (IPOs) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. We examine changes in exchange governance and listing requirements. On a theme not addressed before, we 
find that simple listings were far more numerous than actual IPOs. IPOs in Greece remained unregulated throughout the 
period. Their under-pricing became pronounced in the later parts of the period, especially the 1920s. The study presents 
data on ‘quasi-IPOs’ (that is, capital increases shortly after listing) and shows that they offer a more accurate assessment of 
the demand for the financing of listing firms in an emerging market. Robust evidence is presented to show that as the 
Exchange developed it also underwent a change in character, becoming more oriented to the domestic market and catering 
to smaller firms in domestic manufacturing in the post-First World War era that marked the end of early globalization. 
The object of this article is to study listings and public offerings of securities on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) from its 
inception in 1880 to the entry of Greece into the Second World War in 1940. No previous comparable research exists for the growth 
of the Greek Stock Exchange. This is a first study of capital raising in an emerging European exchange to be juxtaposed with 
several such studies of developed exchanges in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 
Stock exchanges are trade venues, but their longer-term significance lies in their role in the funding of public and private 
ventures and the growth of firms and sectors. The impetus for the development of exchanges in Europe since the eighteenth century 
has been furnished by the need to amass capital resources. Exchanges combine the collection of capital with the advantage of 
secondary trading. These two fundamental aspects of growth are not inseparable. Listing on an exchange can occur with or without 
a concurrent public offering. Whereas a public offering is a direct capital-gathering exercise, listing can make an indirect 
contribution by increasing the visibility and the reputation of a potential issuer. In developed liquid markets, public offers are a very 
visible activity. In emerging, less liquid markets, however, simple listings may predominate in market development. The present 
study focuses on listings and public offerings as separable aspects of capital gathering. Our findings underpin this separation: public 
offerings in the ASE were relatively limited, even during periods when listings were in high demand. We offer analysis of this 
feature. 
The creation of the ASE was the second major financial innovation in nineteenth-century Greece, after the establishment of 
the National Bank in the 1840s. By way of acknowledging the international context, we note that the late nineteenth century was a 
period of ‘emergence’ of many peripheral stock markets in Europe and the rest of the world. These markets grew alongside well-
established ones in the European centres.2 Their ‘emergence’ was correlated with the rise of international capital flows to new 
sovereign states, especially in the form of government loans.3 The ASE was no exception. Officially chartered over the period 
1876–8, it started operations in 1880. In 1878 the Greek state had regained access to foreign finance after an embargo of 45 years. 
The ASE, in which both government bonds and private stocks would trade, was a necessary mechanism for capital gathering and 
transfer, and would prove to be one of the longest-lived institutions in modern Greece. 
Greek political and economic history was turbulent over the period 1880–1940. The country’s area and population 
practically doubled. Changes were not gradual but abrupt, mostly outcomes of wars that were won and wars that were lost; and 
2 
 
there was a succession of periods that ranged from sovereign bankruptcy in 1893 to impressive leaps in development in the early 
1900s and the 1920s. Over the 60 years covered in this study, Greece was embroiled in six wars and two sovereign bankruptcies. 
The Exchange evolved along a path defined by economic conditions of each period.4 Arguably, it provided a mechanism for 
mobilization of resources and modernization through the recapitalization of older firms and the emergence of new ventures and 
sectors. 
Recent historical research on financial development has been influenced by prevalent institutional theories: one is the view 
of the positive impact of ‘common law’ systems;5 the other is the view of the positive impact of ‘openness’ and capital flow 
liberalization which contain the power of domestic financial incumbents and liberate a financial dynamic.6 The Greek legal system 
has been of the continental variety so that it cannot explain the variation between periods of market development and periods of 
stagnation. On the front of economic openness and the perspective argued by Rajan and Zingales, Greece followed the general path 
of many other European countries. It remained open to capital flows and participated in the rise of globalization up to the First 
World War. From that point on, Greece became a relatively closed economy but, interestingly, one with expanding frontiers. The 
actual occurrence and direction of capital flows varied throughout the period, especially as a result of sovereign bankruptcies, wars, 
and the collapse of international monetary systems. In sum, we argue that the variation between stock market development and 
stagnation and the character of development cannot be prima facie attributed to large shifts in the legal system, but can be 
understood on the basis of economic ‘openness’ and economic size. In addition, and since historical detail matters, we focus on 
economic conjuncture and the factors affecting variation of the size and character of the domestic market that expanded 
significantly over the period of study. We provide a test of the relation of listing activity with economic growth, and find positive 
results. 
Financial theories of capital gathering establish useful propositions that can inform historical study. It is generally 
acknowledged that markets for external finance can only function if there is an adequate level of trust between investors, issuers, 
and sponsors. In a variety of financial models, a specific aspect of trust is represented as informational asymmetry. Prior argument 
and evidence indicate that such asymmetry can make the cost of external finance so high as to be prohibitive.7 In a theoretical 
context more directly applicable to initial public offerings (IPOs), it is argued that asymmetric information among investors leads to 
underpricing of new issues, an effect likened to a ‘winners’ curse’.8 A considerable strand of subsequent literature has upheld the 
notion that institutional, regulatory, and governance arrangements can mitigate asymmetries and improve trust.9 However, extensive 
empirical work in contemporary markets has verified considerable underpricing of new equity issues, but with much variation 
across time and space.10 
Taking the cue from contemporary markets, historical researchers have focused on capital gathering in the major European 
markets (where transactions and data are ample) and have examined the underpricing phenomenon in IPOs of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Chambers and Dimson, examining the track record of the London Exchange, make a remarkable 
observation: a long-term rise in underpricing appears to have occurred over time, in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, 
and the prestige of IPO underwriters.11 
Working on the Berlin Exchange, investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced, on the contrary, low 
spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market.12 Evidence reveals that 
during the early twentieth century IPOs were regulated more heavily in Germany than in Britain and as a result the failure rate of 
IPOs on the Berlin Stock Exchange was lower than it was in London.13 Even though German IPO business was in the hands of an 
oligopoly, the terms of IPOs, through tight regulation of underwriting, ensured the quality of firms on the German market.14 We 
draw a lesson from regulatory experiences in early developed markets, as compared to a peripheral one with minimal regulation. 
A peripheral emerging market, like the ASE in the nineteenth century, cannot be approached on the same footing and with 
the same analytical agenda as developed central markets in Europe, where frequent transactions and ample data are available. Its 
institutional reputation had to be established and its liquidity had to be secured in an environment where liquidity was generally 
scarce and monetary values exhibited great fluctuation. It follows that when we examine listing requirements and the growth of the 
Exchange in terms of listings and primary offerings, we must be cognizant of a more general correlation of the path of the 
Exchange to economic and political conditions. Thus, we pay much attention to historical circumstance in the Greek economy over 
the period. 
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Unlike studies focusing on developed markets, we have expanded the meaning of IPOs to capital increases occurring in the 
two years following listing. We have collected data on these capital increases and compare them to actual primary offerings. The 
view of listings as a first step towards the raising of external capital finds support from these comparisons.15 We also undertake 
limited analysis of IPO underpricing itself, within the confines of our small number of observations. The results are not surprising 
in the face of contemporary international evidence. 
IPOs remained unregulated throughout the period and there is little evidence concerning the involvement of professional 
investment banking in primary security issues and their pricing. This is a major difference from developed markets of that period, 
where IPOs were regulated and investment banking was formalized. It does not appear that standardized arrangements of 
investment banking emerged in Greece, although some services of investment bankers were provided. Hence, disclosure quality 
remained uneven and low. The population of IPOs was also low. It is noteworthy nonetheless that even in this small population 
underpricing made an appearance a considerable time after the end of the First World War. We present historical conjectures for the 
timid growth of IPOs and look at possible factors to explain IPO pricing in line with the empirical literature. 
The early enlargement of the Greek stock market was clearly driven by demand for listings. This implies that, contrary to 
what we know of developed markets, the study of listings is a pillar for understanding the evolution of peripheral markets. In the 
Greek case, we document a decisive shift in the character, size, and sector of listings and IPOs between the first decades of ASE 
operation and the boom decade of the 1920s. This shift was related to a reorientation of economic activity, with emphasis on light 
domestic manufacturing. It also correlated to stock market entries by smaller firms, a phenomenon that may be described as a 
‘democratization of market finance’. Interestingly, this democratization was evident in the population of listings but also implied 
visible changes in pricing of primary offerings. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section I discusses the creation of the ASE, the evolution of its governance, 
and listing requirements. Section II presents the periodization of our study, the historical features of each sub-period, and the related 
characteristics of our dataset. In section III we present the main statistical features of our dataset, including the discussion of quasi-
IPOs. We also present hypotheses about the macro-determinants of new listings. In section IV we undertake an analysis of IPO 
pricing and describe a model of underpricing. In section V we present the empirical results of simple regression models. Section VI 
concludes the article. 
I: Exchange foundation, governance, and development 
I.1: Unregulated public offers, the ‘free market’, and the genesis of an organized market 
The birth of the ASE was doubtlessly conditioned by a dramatic precedent: a ferocious cycle of mania and panic that grew 
out of unregulated public offers of shares traded in an informal market in the early 1870s. The mania coincided with the first 
attempts at Greek industrialization,16 focused on mining and metalworking shares primarily, but encompassed banking shares as 
well. This was a time of speculative frenzy in other European exchanges. The link of the Athenian transactions with those of 
Europe was forged through the activities of Greek ‘diaspora’ financiers, who, during the 1870s, were increasingly active in Athens, 
along with the Ottoman Empire and other European capitals.17 
Citizens of the independent Kingdom of Greece thus had their first serious brush with a speculative bubble in 1873. The 
public offer that sparked the mania involved shares in a company running the metal processing plant around the mine of Lavrion, a 
rich source of silver in ancient times. Rumours and reckless political rhetoric about endless riches led to spectacularly high prices, 
succeeded by rapid decline in early 1874.18 The ‘Lavreotika’, as the events were called, would remain etched in collective memory. 
The inauguration of public offers of equity shares in Greece became an occasion of loss and social suspicion against financial 
tycoons. The social mistrust would influence both the decision to create an organized exchange and proceedings at that exchange 
for at least the early years of its operation. 
The drama of the boom and bust of 1873–4 played out in an informal market that was operating in and around a popular 
Athenian coffee house. Share sales were conducted literally ‘over the counter’ in coffee shops, grocery stores, and merchant 
establishments. The organization of new issues, the pricing of the offers, and the details of distribution were managed primarily by 
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the issuers and two newly founded merchant banks: the Credit Bank, established in 1872, and the Industrial Credit Bank, 
established in early 1873. The two banks had been launched by competing groups of recently arrived Greek ‘diaspora’ financiers 
and had also offered shares to the public.19 Merchant banking was surely a significant innovation in the economy of Greece at the 
time. The prime mover of innovation was Andreas Syngros, a famous financier-tycoon who had made a fortune in the Ottoman 
Empire, trading commodities and Ottoman public bonds. 
In the aftermath of the bust and the political outcry that ensued, the creation of an organized market was announced in 1876 
with the publication of a royal decree that contained the first charter and a body of rudimentary rules of the Exchange. The rulebook 
would be revised in 1879 and actual operation would be inaugurated in 1880.20 Operation has continued to this day, with several 
interruptions during wars and crises, of course, making the ASE the second longest-lived financial institution in the country.21 
A landmark development that would change the course of the Greek market for capital had preceded the launch of the 
Exchange: the Greek state, embargoed for decades from international markets due to sovereign defaults in the 1830s, regained 
access to international borrowing.22 This was a time in which the international markets for bonds were expanding, strong capital 
exports from the developed European economies were directed to the world periphery, and the role of exchanges was prominent in 
the process. In that context, the prospect of capital inflows to Greece hastened the inauguration of the organized Exchange as an 
official trading venue for government paper, company equities, or bonds.23 
A remarkable aspect of the Exchange as a public market for securities is that its charter included no regulation of public 
offers of shares, nor was a public offer required for listing. The absence of such provision appears all the more conspicuous 
considering the traumatic events of 1873–4. The continuation of the unregulated status of public offers testified to the power of 
issuers and financiers, especially at a time when Greece was reconnecting to the international financial market in which 
entrepreneurs belonging to the Greek diaspora were already active. 
In our view, a policy that could encourage IPO growth would have been quality regulation of IPOs and especially mandatory 
disclosure rules. Such regulation already existed in more developed markets. In Greece, however, it was not forthcoming. This is 
puzzling, considering that regulation of both listing requirements and transaction rules was undertaken during the period. The 
Exchange was not a government operation. It was a self-regulated entity governed by its members.24 It had basic rules of transaction 
and settlement, as well as minimum listing requirements. In its first bulletin, issued on 12 May 1880,25 the 17 securities listed for 
trading included six government bonds, one corporate bond, and 10 company equities. As we document below, listings were far 
more numerous than IPOs. Most companies would acquire their first capital before listing by placement of shares among narrow 
groups or even a public offer. They would also engage in capital increases after listing. In following sections of the article, we will 
take a closer look at governance reforms and the analysis of listings and public offerings of private shares. 
The inauguration of the Exchange did not subjugate legally (or in practice) the pre-existing ‘free market’ for shares, as the 
over-the-counter market was called in nineteenth-century Athens. The two coexisted and operated in parallel. Shares listed on the 
Exchange would trade in both markets, but of course many non-listed shares were also traded over the counter. In fact, it appears 
that the ‘free market’ was a lively one. In the early years, trading on the Exchange would last for up to three-quarters of an hour, but 
the ‘free market’ would continue. A contemporary newspaper reports that the more important transactions were conducted in the 
‘free market’.26 In 1884 there was trading of 26 company shares (including a few foreign ones) in the ‘free market’, more than twice 
the number of shares listed on the Exchange. Some of the shares traded off-market would go on to become listed, having 
presumably proved their tradability.27 It is notable that no foreign company issues were traded on the Exchange. 
An early historian of the ASE wrote: ‘This “free market” operated in the streets around the Stock Exchange. It functioned 
from morning till night, often to midnight. It was not organized. Some dealers had offices, others not. The trading customs followed 
those of the official Exchange. Guarantees and sureties required were, as a rule, lower than the normal ones’.28 The ‘free market’ 
was to be officially sidelined by the grant of monopoly status to the Exchange in 1918; however, evidence of free market operations 
persists in press reports throughout the 1920s. 
I.2: The contours of stock exchange development 
In this section we present broad quantitative characteristics of the ASE, over the period examined, and its appearance in 
comparison to other contemporary markets. Our evidence is limited, as we have no systematic data on trading volumes and 
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transactions, until the very last part of the period. Nevertheless, we have hand-calculated end-of-year estimates of capitalizations for 
selected years, which enable a comparative view. As mentioned in the previous section, during the first 40 years of the period a 
‘free market’ was functioning outside the official Exchange, but so far we have discovered little reliable quantitative evidence of its 
activity. Thus, what we report here refers only to the official Exchange. We explain data sources and limitations in appendix I. 
The creation of stock exchanges in the nineteenth century was often motivated by trading needs for government debt. The 
Greek case was no exception, since its organization coincided with the re-entry of Greece into the international bond market. It is 
therefore important to gauge the relative weight of private stocks as compared to public and private debt securities. In table 1 we 
present capitalizations for each category of security at the end of each decade from 1880 to 1930, all estimated in gold sovereigns. 
The relative weight of shares as compared to government bonds is not negligible, varying from a low of about 18 per cent in 
1900 to a high of 108 per cent in 1920. It is important to note that large changes in the capitalization of public debt are observed in 
periods when public borrowing had intensified, as was the case in the 1890s and the 1920s. (We comment on financial events in 
these periods in section II.) Although we have no evidence on trading volumes in the earlier periods, we can gain a glimpse of 
relative magnitudes in the period 1929–40, for which volume data are available, as shown in figure 1. 
Figure 1 shows clearly that trading volume for shares does surpass bond trading in some periods, notably in 1929, again as 
an indication that shares were by no means a negligible portion of Exchange activity. The fact that the Exchange quickly became a 
trading venue for private shares is significant as an indication that private sector activity was growing. 
A second major question for which we gathered evidence is the comparative standing of the ASE relative to other 
contemporary exchanges. The starting point for a comparative view is to use widely accepted indices such as the ratio of 
capitalization to GDP and the number of listed firms per million inhabitants. In order to obtain as broad a comparison view as 
possible, we reproduce below parts of two tables from Rajan and Zingales to which we add (as a last row) our estimates for Greece 
in the same years (table 2).29 In the right panel we show metrics for capitalizations over GDP and on the left panel we show the 
number of listed firms per million people. Our estimates of capitalization in Greece include only equity shares. 
The capitalization-to-GDP ratios—despite the reservations that have been voiced about their comparability—show that 
Greece was relatively high in 1913, comparable to the US and Germany, but went to a low level in 1938. Thus, at the peak of 
prewar globalization, the Greek Exchange appears to be within the European trend, but later experiences considerable decline, due 
both to the general reversion of globalization and to its own particular circumstances, as we shall presently explain. 
Looking at the metric of listed firms per million inhabitants, we note that Greece remains at the low end of the comparative 
scale but shows clear growth between 1913 and 1929. In the latter year its metric is in fact comparable to that of Germany and 
Sweden. In the last year, 1938, the Greek ratio is somewhat lower than in 1929 but again remains comparable to that of Germany 
and Sweden. On the whole, it appears that the ASE was following a pattern similar to other European exchanges and that, at least in 
terms of listed firms, it developed a visible dynamic during the first decades of the twentieth century. This dynamic will be a central 
aspect of our inquiry in later sections of this article. 
A more detailed comparison with the more developed exchanges of the UK and Germany can also be made, on the basis of 
published data, for the metrics of listed firms per million inhabitants and IPOs per million inhabitants. In figure 2 we show the 
comparative estimates for the period 1900–25 (online appendix S2 shows the detailed data). 
The left side of the diagram confirms that the ASE was comparable to Berlin in terms of the density of listed firms, but both 
were much lower than London. On the right side of the diagram where IPO densities are compared, however, the ASE is located 
below the others throughout the period. Thus, the scarcity of IPO activity on the Greek Exchange, relative to what is observed in the 
more developed exchanges, is a basic observation which will be analysed in later sections. Possible factors that will be considered 
in later discussion are related to liquidity conditions, but also to questions of transparency and regulation of the quality of IPO 
activity. 
I.3: Exchange governance and its successive reforms 
From a governance standpoint, the Exchange remained a self-regulated organization until 1918, when a landmark law 
imposed government interventions.30 Law 1308 of 1918 was inspired by analogous legislation of the 1890s and 1900s in civil law 
Commented [K1]: 1 TYPESETTER: insert table 2 near here 
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jurisdictions, mainly Germany, France, and Italy; its timing was clearly related to the occurrence of a very large stock exchange 
bubble in 1918 and the rapid increase in speculation that had followed the end of the war. The new law brought about an overhaul 
both of legal status and operating procedures. The Exchange became a public legal entity and was granted a monopoly on legal 
transactions of shares and bonds, following earlier French and German arrangements. Other provisions covered brokers’ duties, 
clearing and settlement, and types of transactions, including cash, forward, option, and repos. The law additionally introduced, for 
the first time, penal sanctions for misinformation, fraud, and abuse of investors’ trust.31 
Law 1308 established direct government intervention in Exchange affairs; the government acquired major powers not only 
for oversight but also in decision making. An inspector’s office was installed for supervision of the rules of trading, with the power 
to suspend Exchange operation for up to five days. An ‘Exchange Council’, separate from the Exchange’s governing board, was 
constituted; its composition included public servants, bank representatives, and brokers, the latter being a minority. The Council 
wielded powers over policy, broker licensing, listings, and delistings (to which we return below). It was chaired by the Secretary 
General of the Ministry of Economy.32 The Council represented severe curtailment in the power of brokers, removing from their 
control two decisions of strategic importance: broker licensing and securities listing. 
Ten years later, a new law—Law 3632 of 1928—was passed, revising governance structures, rules, and operations.33 As was 
true at the time of the Exchange’s original founding in 1878, this was also a period of major change in financial architecture in 
Greece and in the country’s adherence to international monetary arrangements. In May 1928, Greece established a new central 
bank, the Bank of Greece, which took over responsibility for monetary management; Greece committed to the gold exchange 
standard at the same time. The prospect of regaining full participation in the international monetary system and a new opening to 
the international economy provided the impetus for modernization of the Exchange.34 
The 1928 law clarified the responsibilities of the government inspector with regard to the governing board of the Exchange, 
which was made up of broker-members. Importantly, the Exchange Council that had been established in 1918 now assumed final 
decision-making powers in matters that had earlier required Ministerial or Cabinet approval. In that sense, the new legislation 
‘depoliticized’ the decision process and allowed speedier decision making. In the same spirit, a special ‘Exchange Court’ was 
established which would rapidly adjudicate differences, claims, and frauds arising from transactions both among brokers and 
between brokers and clients.35 The explicit justification for instituting this court was the need for speedy resolution of disputes, 
which was impossible to achieve in the regular courts.36 The penal sanctions for market abuse came under the jurisdiction of the 
special court, and this improved speed of enforcement. The law rebalanced the governance, re-expanding Exchange autonomy in 
areas that had been relegated to government decision in 1918, such as licensing, listing, and brokers’ disputes. 
A brokers’ Guarantee Fund, whose primary form had been already established in August 1923, was now fully organized as a 
collectively financed self-insurance fund for brokers. Its express purpose was to cover obligations to other brokers in case of a 
broker’s default, and to compensate investors. The Guarantee Fund has proved a stable arrangement that survives to this day. 
The reform of 1928 sought to improve both the efficiency and the credibility of Exchange operation. The provisions for 
speedier enforcement of prohibitions of market abuse and of the compensation scheme for investor losses due to broker failures 
formed the first cohesive framework for investor protection in Greece. 
I.4: Listing requirements 
At the beginning of its operation the Exchange instituted and followed two basic listing conditions for shares of private 
companies. The first was very specific: at least one-third of the company capital had to be paid up. This ensured credibility for 
original owners, but was also an anti-speculative device against the sale of empty shells on the Exchange floor. It was not necessary 
to conduct a public offer of shares to obtain listing. There was, however, a second condition for listing: a general provision that 
shares must show potential for trading activity.37 The determination of this potential was left to the governing board of the 
Exchange, based on evidence furnished by the candidate company. Besides papers certifying its legal status and some form of 
financial statements, tradability could logically be established on only two grounds: first, evidence of the actual dispersion of 
ownership before listing; and second, actual trading in the lively informal market which was in operation at least until the 1920s. It 
is highly probable that evidence of off-market trading was acceptable in the early years, since the ‘free market’ was legitimate until 
1918, when the Exchange acquired the legal monopoly of transactions in shares. 
7 
 
A far-reaching innovation included in Law 1308 of 1918 was the change in listing requirements and procedures. As 
compared to the previous constraint of a minimum percentage of paid-up capital,38 the size of capital now became a prerequisite for 
listing. In addition, companies were required to have published at least two annual financial statements prior to the time of listing if 
their capital exceeded 2 million drachmas (80,580 gold sovereigns), and one set of annual financial accounts if their capital 
exceeded 5 million39 (201,450 gold sovereigns). Thus, larger capital size was accepted as a criterion of quality. With regard to 
financial statements, the law made no mention of either accounting standards or audits. Nevertheless, the fact that financial 
reporting was elevated to a legal prerequisite for listing boosted the accounting process and the accounting profession. 
The size criterion acted as a double-edged instrument: it encouraged large firms, even if they were newly formed ventures, to 
seek listing. The earlier requirement of evidence of tradability did not appear in Law 1308. It would be inconsistent for a law that 
instituted a legal monopoly of Exchange transactions to require evidence that implicitly admitted the function of the informal 
market. 
The same Law of 1918 took the power of listing (and delisting) decisions away from the governing board of the Exchange, 
that is, the brokers. The Exchange Council (constituted as described in the previous section) assumed the responsibility of 
proposing listing for Ministerial approval. This represented a politicization of listings that would be severely criticized both in terms 
of slowness of process and as governmental meddling.40 In the parliamentary proposal for this law, it was generally accepted that 
the government could assure the elimination of speculative excess.41 
Ten years later, Law 3632 of 1928 again revised listing requirements for shares. The size of capital required for listing was 
raised to five million drachmas (13,427 gold sovereigns) and annual financial statements for at least three years prior to listing were 
mandated; however, companies whose capital exceeded 10 million (26,852 gold sovereigns) were allowed to present only one 
year’s financial accounts. The increase in capital size was only nominal. In gold sovereign terms (see also online appendix S7), the 
change in required capital represented a substantial reduction in real terms. This accords with the evidence we present in section 
IV.1 on the size of companies being listed on the ASE. In addition, candidate companies had to provide information about their 
shareholdings and their history of capital increases prior to listing.42 Thus, evidence of dispersion of ownership and tradability made 
its way back on to the complement of listing requirements. Law 3632 of 1928 rebalanced the power of decision over listings. It 
vested the Exchange Council with decision-making authority for listings, abolishing direct ministerial power, but at the same time 
maintaining the limits on brokers’ influence. The Council became a ‘listing authority’ that could act speedily and expertly on 
admissions to trading. It is worth repeating that, like its predecessors, this more sophisticated law included no explicit regulation of 
public offers of shares. The conduct of public offers continued to be unregulated until after the Second World War. 
II: Exchange listings and IPOs, 1880 to 1940: the impact of the environment 
II.1: The comprehensive data 
Using archival data from the files of the ASE and the National Bank of Greece, press reports, and Exchange bulletins, we 
have put together table 3, which shows new listings and IPOs of equity shares in the years 1880–1940. In Figure 3 we show the 
number of listings and IPOs per year. 
The data in figure 3 show two general characteristics. The first is that listings by far exceeded IPOs throughout the period. 
Over the 60 years (1880–1940) there are 165 new listings of companies and of those only 21 conducted concurrent IPOs. Thus, 
market development was primarily based on listings. Second, there is a strong movement of ebb and flow over the years in the 
process of listing. There are periods of little or no listing activity and other periods with a rapid pace of new listings. Finally, we 
note that 1925 is an ‘outlier year’ when both listings and IPOs were very numerous compared to the entire period. We will return to 
this in section VI. 
It is important to note that visible jumps in listing activity preceded the changes in listing requirements in 1918 and 1928. 
Both major legal changes in 1918 and 1928 occurred after episodes of rapid price increases that were followed by subsequent rapid 
declines. So legal changes occurred in the midst (or towards the end) of periods when listing activity was strong and continuous. 
Our basic observation is therefore that development was not led by legal change but rather by an autonomous demand for listings. 
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Demand for listings was linked to economic conditions and expectations. In fact, the economic and political environment was in 
constant turmoil. Over the 60 years from 1880 to 1940, Greece was embroiled in two world wars, four local wars, and two 
sovereign bankruptcies. It also experienced remarkable periods of growth. It is impossible to gain an understanding of the 
movement of listings and IPOs without a broader history review, since shifts were not random but, to a large extent, historically 
conditioned. 
Before embarking on the historical review, we must ponder the distinction between listing with and without a public offering 
of shares, as this is a dominant characteristic of the data in online appendix S2. The question is what incentive there was to list, if 
immediate access to external equity finance was not sought simultaneously. The question becomes even sharper if we recall that the 
Exchange was not a monopolistic trading venue but coexisted and competed with the ‘free market’ for more than half the period. If 
listing simply meant access to trading liquidity for company owners, the ‘free market’ was available and apparently quite active. So 
what would a firm gain by listing (but not raising capital concurrently) on the Exchange? 
Two conjectures fit the qualitative evidence. First, the attainment of listing requirements was a reputational signal for the 
company being listed, since successful examination by Exchange authorities offered a type of ‘certification’, something that could 
not exist for the ‘free market’.43 Second, companies that obtained listing could exploit their new visibility to proceed to subsequent 
capital increases by secondary offers, after establishing a track record on the Exchange. This implies that listings were not ‘stand-
alone’ decisions but part of a process at the end of which external equity capital was indeed raised.44 Contemporaries also noted that 
listings at times of high inflation enabled inflation adjustment to company capital. Indeed, for a large portion of the period under 
study inflation was high. In any case, although listing was not contemporaneous to an offer of new shares, it could act as a 
precondition to one. In addition, the low liquidity in the overall economy must have also contributed to this result. 
In this connection, the benefits of Exchange listing include the condition that access to the market trading facilitates 
subsequent funding, supports the creation of a market for the company’s shares, boosts liquidity, and broadens the shareholder 
base.45 
II.2: The period of rising globalization, 1880–1913 
Although Greek history has many turning points in the period of study, it is useful to follow an internationally accepted 
periodization. The period is divided into two parts using 1914, the year of the outbreak of the First World War, as a dividing point. 
The first period, 1880–1913, includes the years of rising globalization. The second period, 1914–40, includes the war years, postwar 
adjustment, and the crisis of the 1930s.46 In this and the next section we provide a historical review of Greek developments, in order 
to underscore particular aspects that, beyond the international trends, conditioned the development of the Exchange, and more 
particularly listing activity. 
The last 20 years of the nineteenth century witnessed a great cycle in Greek economic fortunes. In 1878, as stated earlier, 
Greece had regained access to international markets and a large inflow of borrowed funds occurred, giving a visible boost to 
liquidity, investment, and general economic activity. The 1880s saw the launch of major infrastructural projects, railroads, roads, 
and the Corinth Canal, leading to feverish construction activity. Several of these highly visible projects were included in the list of 
early IPOs conducted on the Exchange, as we shall see presently. 
The increasing burden of public debt and the intensification of military spending, however, produced a fiscal crisis in the late 
1880s. International lending also became much restricted after the Baring Crisis and the Argentine default in 1892. Greece 
followed, defaulting in 1893. In the ensuing years the drachma devalued substantially and import tariffs were imposed, eventually 
boosting domestic production and exports. However, war with Turkey broke out in 1897 with disastrous consequences: besides the 
demoralization of defeat, Greece undertook heavy reparation payments to Turkey. The country’s public finances were placed under 
international financial control in 1898.47 
In the years after the sovereign default, protection and devaluation had a positive impact on domestic production. The 
reflection of these movements is observable on the ASE and a changing composition of listings in the early years of the twentieth 
century. 
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New listings on the Exchange were quite numerous in the 1880s and the 1890s, with eight listings in the first decade and 10 
in the second. In the 1880s, the main feature was the promotion of infrastructure investments and military production: of eight 
companies listed, three were railroads, two were construction firms, and one was a powder and explosives company. In the 1890s 
listings were more diversified, reflecting the acceleration of domestic production: listed companies were active in energy, shipping, 
textiles, and machine tools. Thus, we observe the first appearance of ‘industrial stocks’ on the Exchange. The largest company 
listed during this period was a bank, the Bank of Athens. In these two decades, and as compared to 15 new listings, there were five 
IPOs. They reflected the trends of the time: a munitions manufacturer, two railroad companies, a bank, and a company managing 
public land rents. 
The years following international financial control of public finances represent one of the most turbulent periods in the 
country’s economic history. Fiscal adjustment was gradually achieved and the drachma followed a path of revaluation in the early 
years of the new century, reaching parity with the golden franc and maintaining this parity until 1918. The balance of payments 
improved especially with the emergence of remittances from emigrants and shipping, which constituted a fresh source of domestic 
liquidity.48 The country regained confidence with new and more technologically advanced firms making their appearance, and 
showing up in Exchange listings, as we discuss presently. Spearheaded by an officers’ revolt in 1909, a new government promoted 
broad modernization in an open-economy context. It would be fair to characterize the first decade of the twentieth century as a 
period of peace and recovery, with fiscal and monetary stability. This would soon change, however. 
With new confidence towards the Ottoman Empire, which was disintegrating, Greece went to war in 1912–13, and the 
victorious outcome saw a doubling of its territory to the north and the south (with the union of Crete) and a near-doubling of its 
population.49 This signified a large extension of its internal market, a factor that would play a significant role in the ensuing period. 
The ASE experienced a boom during this period, in the years 1904–6, when recovery and currency revaluation had 
entrenched themselves.50 Leading sectors in the listings were banks, steamship companies, cement companies, and the first Greek 
electric utility. Steamship companies represented the most export-oriented sector of the time. Overall, the decade of stability (1900–
10) saw the foundation of larger companies, undertaking new investments and seeking greater efficiency. 
As a notable feature of quickened listing activity, new banks were systematically emerging. One factor was the large 
increase in inflows of foreign exchange in the form of remittances from recent Greek emigrants and from shipping. These provided 
a new source of private liquidity. Foreign private investments also made their appearance during the decade, directed especially to 
new banking ventures.51 Arguably, the listing of banks was an indicator of the broader entrepreneurial climate in the Exchange and 
the economy. In 1900–13 there were 24 listings and only three IPOs. All three were conducted by new banks (the Bank of Crete, 
the Bank of Anatolia, and the Commercial Bank) and occurred before 1910. 
II.3: Wars, the ‘roaring twenties’, and world crisis: 1914–40 
Greece joined the Entente in the First World War and obtained further territorial gains. The period of 1916–19 was, despite 
the war, one of economic optimism for the future of an enlarged nation. However, the war for Greece did not end in 1918. The 
country became embroiled in war with Turkey in Asia Minor in 1920, ending in defeat for Greece in 1922. That defeat brought 
another kind of expansion: almost one-and-a-half million of Asia Minor’s Greeks were forced to move to Greece as refugees. This 
huge and sudden ‘population shock’ was initially debilitating and had dire fiscal consequences, as the country tried to cope with a 
huge resettlement effort. The 10 years of almost continuous war had, as expected, forced new fiscal imbalance, monetary financing 
of budgets, drachma devaluation, and inflation of the order of 8–55 per cent annually in the period after the war. 
Inflation and domestic demand dominated the motives for company formations and listings in this period. Devaluation and 
trade protectionism boosted the emergence of enterprises that catered to the domestic market and this happened inevitably during 
the 10-year period of Greece’s engagement in wars. 
The ‘population shock’ of 1922 was experienced as a disaster by the uprooted but became a sort of growth engine for the 
economy. Asia Minor Greeks were skilled and enterprising, and they soon sought new ventures in their new home. Furthermore, 
public spending (including foreign aid) on refugee assistance expanded domestic demands for food, clothing, and housing. After the 
end of the wars, the pace of growth picked up; 1923–9 was a distinct episode of rapid development in recent Greek history. 
Inflation also continued, but was on the whole much lower than the earlier decade, averaging an annual rate of 13 per cent in the 
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years 1924–7.52 In 1928 Greece, under pressure from international donors, undertook monetary stabilization, pegged the drachma to 
the British pound sterling (which adhered to the gold exchange standard), and created a central bank, the Bank of Greece, to oversee 
and execute monetary policy.53 Once again Greece became a full participant in the international monetary system, although the 
system itself proved short-lived. 
The 1929 crash in the New York market ushered in a period of general financial crisis and depression. On 21 September 
1931 the pound sterling went off the gold standard and the Greek government closed down the Exchange and all trading in foreign 
exchange. In April 1932, Greece itself abandoned the gold exchange standard and declared official default on its public debt. The 
Exchange did not reopen until December of that year. Following most advanced countries, once again Greece instituted 
protectionist measures. The crisis was not as harsh in Greece as in most advanced industrial economies. Under the protectionist 
regime, the economy picked up and local manufacturing was energized.54 This moderate but upward economic trend would be 
finally interrupted with the eruption of the Second World War in 1939.55 
In the 1920s, especially after 1924, the Exchange experienced another boom and an unprecedented record in new listings. In 
total 71 companies were admitted to trading in this period, of which most prominent were banking firms with 15 listings, textiles 
with 12, construction with 8, and chemicals and food each with 7 new listings. This listing activity represented about 50 per cent of 
all listings since the Exchange’s inception and would not be encountered again until postwar booms occurred in the 1970s and the 
1990s. In the ensuing decade of the 1930s, new listings would continue but at a much reduced pace, with 33 new admissions to 
trading, textile firms accounting for about one-third of that number. A very interesting feature of the 1930s was that the financial 
stabilization of the late 1920s and the financial crisis of the 1930s led to the failure or merger of many of the new banks that had 
emerged during the boom of the 1920s.56 
As compared to the record 104 new listings in this sub-period, 11 IPOs were conducted. All of those took place before 1930, 
when a long stoppage in IPO activity ensued, which lasted throughout the whole decade of the 1930s. Nine IPOs represented offers 
of manufacturing stocks, one of which was conducted by a construction company and one by the newly established central bank. 
This is the period of the clear rise in industrial finance through the Exchange. Aside from this significant shift, however, the number 
of IPOs as a proportion of total listings actually declined as compared to earlier periods.57 
Figure 4 shows a comparison of listings and IPOs, along with their sectoral composition, in the two sub-periods. The large 
growth of listings in the second sub-period is accompanied by a visible increase in the sectoral diversification. This is mostly a 
diversification that encompassed the rise of manufacturing firms. 
II.4: Hypotheses on new listings and Greek economic change 
Our general conjecture, that listing activity on the Exchange was conditioned by growth expectations and prospects, lends 
itself to statistical testing with plausible explanatory variables, available for Greece. We utilize new listings as a percentage of total 
listings (NLTL) as our dependent variable. The hypothesis about its determining factors is that indices of economic state and 
change affect listing activity.58 
Available Greek data are gross domestic product (GDP) and population, the breakdown of GDP into primary, secondary, and 
tertiary sector outputs, and the rate of drachma devaluation; we compute per capita output (GDPpc), output growth rates (G1, G2, 
and G3) for the economy, the secondary (manufacturing), and the tertiary (service) sectors respectively; devaluation is estimated by 
the annual change in the exchange rate of the drachma to the gold sovereign. 
Each of the three estimated variables represents economic conditions. Per capita GDP can proxy for disposable income and 
the potential demand for stocks; growth rates represent expansion of economic opportunities. The currency devaluation can proxy 
for prospects for the profit expansion of domestic manufactures. All three can potentially be positive drivers of new listings. We 
form a simple time-series model to test our hypothesis. 
                NLTL c GDPpc DEV G         (1) 
According to the hypothesis α, β, γ > ( = ) 0. 
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We explore the differentiation of this model across the two sub-periods. As we have already explained, in the first sub-
period the Exchange was more open to international influences, but in the second it was inward-looking, with firms primarily 
oriented towards the internal market. As a consequence, we expect that domestic growth played a differential role in listing activity 
in the second sub-period, as compared to the earlier one. 
The findings from the estimation of this regression are presented in section V. 
III: Listings and IPOs: frequency, size, and quasi-IPOs 
In this section we present quantitative evidence on listings and IPOs, as they evolved over the 60 years under study. We 
address two related research questions. The first relates to the size and age of the firms admitted to listing. Did the Exchange evolve 
towards a trading venue for small and/or young firms, or did it remain the mainstay of established insiders? From a broader 
perspective, this is relevant to the contribution of the Exchange to enterprise development and economic change. 
The second question relates to whether simple listings were actually ‘IPOs in waiting’, that is, listings that were quickly 
followed by a capital increase. The critical issues in this question are visibility and disclosure. If IPOs were rare because disclosure 
was inadequate, capital increases after listing could act as near-substitutes, after the firm had shown a track record on the Exchange. 
We collect data on all cases where a listing was followed, within a period of two years, by an issue of new shares. We consider 
these as ‘quasi-IPOs’ and compare them to actual IPOs and their features. The inclusion of ‘quasi-IPOs’ offers a more accurate 
assessment of the role of the Exchange in the financing of firms, considering that pure IPOs may have been avoided due to the 
persistent lack of IPO regulation and mandatory disclosure. 
III.1: The size and age of listed companies 
Given the multi-faceted economic conditions during the long 60 years that we have described, the examination of basic 
features acquires significance since it allows an evolutionary perspective. We saw that in the early decades there was emphasis on 
infrastructural projects, which were necessarily large, visible, and government-promoted. Manufacturing came later, and its growth 
was largely spurred by expanding domestic market potential. As the type and scale of undertakings by firms changed, we expect 
changes in size over time. 
In the case of simple listings, we measure size by the nominal value of the stock at the time of listing. In the case of IPOs we 
measure the magnitude of the actual offer, defined as the number of shares offered times the offer price. Age is uniformly measured 
as the number of years between the founding of a company and the time of listing. 
Table 3 shows the means of size and age for both simple listings and IPOs. In panel A, the estimates are shown for the whole 
period. In panels B and C, the estimates are shown for each sub-period. 
We first note that the average size of IPO offerings exceeds by far the average size of firms that obtain simple listing. This is 
easy to interpret: IPOs were necessarily used when capital needs were high and could not be satisfied by recourse to narrow 
networks of capital providers or private resources of original owners. Thus, within the IPO dataset there are a few very large 
placements. Yet, as already noted, listings by far exceeded IPOs in number, the latter being a small minority. Looking at the sub-
periods, we note that whereas in the early period 1880–1913, IPOs represented almost 20 per cent of all new listings, in the 
subsequent period the share of IPOs fell to about 11 per cent. We conclude that the growth of the primary market was stunted and 
did not keep pace with the general and considerable expansion of the market as a trading venue. This brings forth the importance of 
the quasi-IPOs that we take up in the next section. 
The estimates in Panels B–C show a clear tendency for reduction in size over time, both for simple listings and IPOs. This is 
consistent with the conjecture that new sectors and smaller undertakings were gaining access to the Exchange over time. At the 
same time the average and especially the median age of listed firms were relatively low (three to five years) and did not show 
considerable change over time. Thus, we conclude that the Exchange was not the mainstay of established insiders, but a venue for 
trading shares of smaller and relatively young firms. This is not unexpected in a small and relatively young country in an early stage 
of development. 
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III.2: IPOs and quasi-IPOs 
We characterize as a quasi-IPO the case where a firm announces a capital increase soon after listing, offering the sale of new 
shares for cash. If the time of the capital increase is indeed close to that of listing, the strategy comes close to this being a delayed 
IPO, rather than a truly ‘seasoned’ offering. We must recall that in the Greek context underwriting was not a developed institutional 
arrangement with all the regulatory requirements of the present day. The primary sale of shares was unregulated and issuers were 
the main decision makers. Disclosure quality at the time of listing was probably low. The function of certification, which in the 
modern literature is attributed to underwriters, was vested in the seal of approval offered by the listing authority itself. Thus a quasi-
IPO would benefit from both the certification of the listing decision and the acquisition of visibility through trading. Unfortunately, 
there is little or no evidence of trading activity, so it is not possible to distinguish firms which acquired a trading track record 
quickly after being listed. Instead, we have imposed a reasonable time limit of two years as a period during which some trading 
record is acquired, but in which the listing certification also retains validity as a reputational asset. Listed firms which engaged in 
capital increases within two years of listing are here considered as quasi-IPOs. Online appendix S4 includes a list of quasi-IPOs that 
took place over the period. 
In table 4 and online appendices S4 and S5 we show descriptive statistics for quasi-IPOs and IPOs for the whole period and 
by sub-period. Size now describes the size of the offer in all cases. Data are classified by the date of listing, not by the date of 
ensuing capital increase in the case of quasi-IPOs. 
As shown in table 4, 42 quasi-IPOs were performed over the period, double the number of IPOs. However, total capital 
raised through these quasi-IPOs amounted to about 1.6 million gold sovereigns, less than half the aggregate amount raised by IPOs 
(3.5 million gold sovereigns). Thus, it appears that quasi-IPOs were chosen by smaller undertakings; these cases were probably 
more needful of the certification and the visibility provided by an Exchange listing before attempting to raise funds. The relation of 
IPOs and quasi-IPOs is strongly reversed over the two sub-periods, as we observe from panels B and C of the table 4. During the 
period 1880–1913, quasi-IPOs were fewer than IPOs and smaller in terms of capital raised. On the contrary, in the period 1914–40, 
quasi-IPOs were far more numerous than IPOs, and, although they represented smaller offerings on average, they led to about the 
same total capital absorption as IPOs. In an era when smaller and younger firms were admitted to listing, the implied usefulness of 
listing as a certification mechanism was clearly stronger. Thus, one conclusion is that smaller firms in particular used Exchange 
listing as a precondition for raising funds after having gained access to market trading. This implies that the supply of securities in 
actual IPOs understated the true demand for capital by new firms and this demand became manifest shortly after listing, for smaller 
firms. Listing itself as a ‘certification’ signal facilitated the supply of new capital in an environment in which mandatory and 
uniform disclosure requirements were not enforced. 
IV: Was there IPO underpricing on the Athens Stock Exchange? 
IV.1: Theoretical justifications 
The underpricing of primary offerings of securities has been extensively researched in modern markets, both developed and 
emerging.59 The phenomenon of placements, where offer prices are systematically lower than subsequent trading prices, has drawn 
much attention, because it constitutes an anomaly within the framework of efficient markets. This anomaly has spurred a large 
amount of research, both in theory and history. 
Theoretical explorations of underpricing have revolved around several basic themes. Ljungqvist has reviewed theories that 
focus either on the demand side or the supply side of primary markets: demand theories devolve on the asymmetry of information 
between issuers and external investors, on one hand, and behavioural factors summarized into the concept of ‘investor sentiment’, 
on the other.60 Supply theories are underpinned by institutional factors (such as law, regulation, and financial practices) and/or 
strategic theories (for example, controlling the ex post shareholder base). Recognizing that regulation and institutional arrangements 
were absent in nineteenth-century Greece, we mostly draw on ideas from demand theories. Asymmetry may lead to an underpricing 
equilibrium in a market with uninformed investors. Investor sentiment presumes over-enthusiasm of buyers in the after-market of 
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the offering. In fact, both aspects can be linked, since the appearance of sentiment is more likely when asymmetry of information is 
more acute. 
Historical studies of large stock exchanges have also focused on IPO underpricing. Several studies in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries find that IPO underpricing varied over the long term. In fact, it appears to have been either absent or very small 
in magnitude in markets such as London and Berlin during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Numerous studies have 
noted that the increase in underpricing occurred over time in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of 
IPO underwriters.61 
IV.2: Pricing on the ASE 
The question in this section is whether underpricing actually occurred on the ASE during our period of study and if anything 
can be said about its determinants. In our case, the number of observed IPOs is limited to 21, and so small a population can hardly 
support stringent statistical testing. We nevertheless marshal evidence from descriptive statistics, simple correlations, and 
qualitative observation. 
In order to measure underpricing accurately, we compare the offer price of shares in each IPO with the shares’ first trading 
price observed from daily press bulletins. Having no estimates of a market index on a daily basis, we have undertaken a market-
return adjustment as follows: for each IPO we isolate two dates, the last day of the offer and the first day of trading. Further, we 
draw from the daily press all shares that traded on both dates and compute a simple average return of the portfolio composed of 
these shares. Thus, for each IPO we have a return for a matching portfolio with the same trading dates. We use this return as a 
proxy for ‘market return’ (MPR) and compute the market-adjusted individual return (MAIR) for each IPO as follows: 
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where, CPi,1 is the first observed trading price of the newly distributed shares of IPOi; OPi,0 is the offering price of IPOi; and MPRi 
is the matching portfolio return for IPOi. In table 5 we present descriptive statistics of the computed MAIR. 
In order to gauge possible determinants of underpricing, we examine popular proxies, found in empirical work with strong 
theoretical justification and measurable from our dataset. These include age and size62 and the percentage of ownership held by pre-
IPO owners. Size and age proxy for asymmetric information between issuer and investors (older and larger firms offer better 
information and are less underpriced). Monitoring incentives are taken to increase with the number of shares sold by the original 
owner at the time of the IPO. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm show that the lower the first-day returns, the greater are the monitoring 
incentives of the issuing firms’ decision makers.63 
Size is measured as the size of the offer, that is, the number of issued shares times the offer price. Offer prices are expressed 
in gold sovereigns throughout. The age of the company at the time of the public offering is measured by the difference in years 
between the date of establishment and the date of the public offering. Finally, given ownership (GO) measures the percentage of 
equity ownership offered to the public at the time of the offering. 
From the estimates in table 5, it is apparent that, on average, underpricing is evident only in the second sub-period (1914–
40), whereas in the early years it appears that offers were overpriced. It can also be seen from the table that in terms of possible 
explanatory variables, the average size of offerings exhibits a dramatic decline between the two sub-periods. We examine simple 
correlations between MAIR and the three possible explanatory variables by means of univariate regressions. The results are 
discussed in section V. 
V: Empirical analysis 
In this section we present the empirical results of estimations undertaken on earlier hypotheses regarding new listings and 
IPO underpricing. Table 6 shows the estimation of regression (3) on the determination of new listings, which is repeated here for 
clarity. 
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                  NLTL c GDPpc DEV G         (3) 
We conduct the estimation of (1) using alternately G1, G2, and G3 (growth rates of overall GDP and of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors, respectively) as the growth factor. We also estimate the same regressions separately for the two sub-periods. In 
table 6 we show the result of the estimations.64 
These results indicate that when the whole period is examined, there is no strong explanatory factor on new listings. GDP 
growth appears as a positive determinant in one of the regressions, and the rate of devaluation appears as a weak negative 
determinant. Looking at sub-period estimations, however, we note a substantial difference between the earlier and later sub-period. 
In the first sub-period, no independent variable is significant. In the second sub-period, however, growth rates exhibit significance, 
especially the growth rate of manufacturing, which emerges as the more positive and significant factor. This provides statistical 
confirmation of our qualitative conjecture that, in the second sub-period, exchange development was energized by the expansion of 
Greece’s internal market. 
The next set of estimations is a series of correlations represented as univariate bootstrapped regressions. The small size of 
the population of IPOs remains of course a barrier to statistical testing of higher stringency (for example, multiple cross-sectional 
regression), but our goal is to gather as many indications as possible from this admittedly small set of observations. 
The following univariate bootstrapped regressions are estimated: 
                  NLTL c GDPpc DEV G         (4a) 
 2 2 2 1   A Ln AGE e    (4b) 
3 3 3   A GO e   (4c) 
Coefficient estimates for β1, β2, and β3 show the correlation of each variable to MAIR. Although general conclusions cannot be 
drawn about the determinants of MAIR from univariate regressions, we can at least gauge if the direction of the correlation accords 
with extant theory and empirical evidence. Table 6 exhibits these results. 
The only observation of significance in table 7 is that the size of an IPO correlates negatively with estimated MAIR. This is 
in line with a long list of findings in the literature and accords with the view that larger size (and visibility) signifies lower 
information asymmetry. However, neither age nor the percentage of given ownership exhibit strong correlation with MAIR, so no 
indications can be gauged about these popular proxies. 
Looking more closely into the composition of the data (table 4 and table 5), we note a striking concentration of IPOs in the 
year 1925. Seven IPOs (a third of the total number over the period) were conducted in that year. The average size of these IPOs was 
11,090 gold sovereigns. Their average underpricing is estimated at 301.89 per cent, a level not found at any other time within our 
study period. Simple listings attained their maximum number in the same year, in which stock prices also peaked. It thus appears 
that 1925 was a very special year that affords a rare glimpse into a ‘hot period’ for the ASE and Greek conditions of liquidity. In 
our dataset, 1925 was the first year of IPO activity after a long pause. The last IPO had taken place seven years earlier, in 1918. 
Independent research into Greek fiscal and monetary conditions of the time indicates that the ‘hot listing period’ was very probably 
connected with macroeconomic factors. The year 1922 was the critical year of Greek defeat and the Asia Minor refugee crisis. 
Historical research indicates that the post-1922 period was one of monetary expansion and inflation that led to decreases in both the 
real wage and the real interest rate, thus enabling higher profitability.65 Increasing profitability is repeatedly mentioned in 
contemporary press reports as a cause of the IPO boom of 1925.66 
Furthermore, 1926 marked a sharp turn (also mentioned in the contemporary press) towards restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies. As Christodoulaki notes, ‘The timing of this change in economic performance is located in late 1925 and early 1926 when 
pressure to improve the fiscal performance of the government and to follow contractionary monetary policies in order to stabilize 
the drachma was increased’.67 The peak in IPO activity observed in 1925 could be therefore attributed to a confluence of factors: 
long pent up demand, high stock market valuations, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. It is indicative that within those 
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conditions it was mostly small firms oriented to the domestic market that sought and gained admission to market for capital-raising. 
As compared to the early large IPOs of the nineteenth century, this represented a true reversal in primary market direction. 
VI: Concluding remarks 
The development of the ASE from its inception (1880) to the outbreak of the Second World War (1940) was an active 
process that took various turns as Greek economic events passed through episodes of growth, sovereign bankruptcy, war, and 
expansion. An important milestone for the character of the Exchange was the end of the era of globalization in 1913. The Exchange 
evolved from a trading venue for government paper and equities of large infrastructural government-sponsored projects to a market 
offering access to small manufacturing firms pursuing indigenous ventures in mostly consumer goods and construction. Thus, the 
Exchange underwent ‘democratization’ from elite large projects to grass-roots private initiatives. 
Over the period, the Exchange accepted 165 new equity listings, besides the mandatory listing of government bonds. The 
stock market experienced several ‘hot periods’ of listing activity and peaking prices. In the first three decades of its operation as a 
trading venue, the Exchange competed with a free market that operated informally alongside the official Exchange. The fact that 
listing activity was robust even under the competition of a ‘free’ market testifies to the value of exchange listing as a type of 
certification that added value and visibility to listed entities. 
The Exchange’s role as a primary market for capital raising through IPOs was limited, however. Only 13 per cent of the 
firms that attained listing over this long period actually performed IPOs. Another 25 per cent chose to increase their capital by 
public offers within two years of acquiring listed status. The low level of IPO activity may have been due initially to the traumatic 
effects of an IPO bubble in the 1870s, before a formal Exchange had been organized. However, even when the effects of the early 
bubble became a distant memory, IPO activity still remained sparse. This may have been the result of insufficient liquidity in an 
emerging economy, but was also related in our view to the lack of regulation, especially adequate provisions for disclosure and IPO 
quality that could have inspired trust in investors. 
Focusing on the parallel activity of quasi-IPOs (capital raising performed within two years of listing), we found that these 
were more widely used than IPOs, especially in the 1920s, which suggests this was a less costly route for capital gathering. The 
difference between IPOs and quasi-IPOs was that the latter had already obtained the stamp of approval of the listing authority and 
had established a trading record. Hence, whereas the same amount of capital raised in an IPO or a quasi-IPO made the same 
demands on liquidity, quasi-IPOs offered differential levels of information about the issuer and apparently met with different levels 
of investor trust. This was very important, given the small size and the character of firms attempting to raise capital in the post-
globalization era. 
It is notable that despite several public interventions in the early twentieth century in the governance structure of the 
Exchange, IPOs remained unregulated, investment banking services were not standardized, and the quality of disclosure was low 
and uneven. This is probably the longer-term explanation for the relative weakness of the primary market. It must be clarified that 
there was no general absence of regulatory activity. Significant regulatory changes did take place from 1918 to 1928, but they were 
focused on listing requirements, secondary trading, and the duties of brokers, rather than IPOs and investment banking. 
Examining the dataset of 21 IPOs undertaken over the period 1880–1940, we note a significant change in character and 
composition in these as well. Whereas banking IPOs appeared throughout the period, non-financial issues shifted from 
infrastructure-related projects and few heavy industry undertakings to light manufacturing ventures mainly oriented to the 
satisfaction of domestic demand. A notable reduction in the average size over time and a visible shift to severe underpricing of IPOs 
around the second decade of the twentieth century are evident trends. Analysis of pricing revealed that reductions in size, increases 
in market liquidity, and the occurrence of ‘hot market’ pressure were proximate causes of the emergence of underpricing. 
In a more general historical assessment, it appears that the ASE showed distinct features during the two sub-periods of this 
study. It grew in both sub-periods. In the period of rising globalization (1880–1913), the growth was realized through listings and 
IPOs of larger firms mainly oriented to infrastructure and banking, as already stated. In the period of deglobalization that started 
with the First World War, and during which Greece experienced considerable growth of space and population, the Exchange 
developed with a clear orientation to the internal market: small and light manufacturing firms, smaller banks, and construction. 
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Thus, the Exchange responded to the major features of economic development in Greece. The large expansion of the domestic 
market offered renewed impetus for listing activity by firms catering to that domestic market. This was also a response to protracted 
war conditions that engendered a de facto protectionism. 
The second aspect of change in the post-First World War and national wars period was the emergence of inflation and 
monetary instabilities. Our evidence shows a large increase in listing activity and IPOs in the 1920s, at a time when inflationary 
profits were making an appearance. These phenomena would come to an abrupt stop when restrictive policies were enacted from 
1926 onwards. Thus, indirectly, it appears that the abundance of monetary liquidity gave a boost to the Exchange, both as a primary 
market and as a listing venue. This is clearly confirmed by our evidence. 
Finally, it is important to note that we have found evidence that listing activity was statistically related to growth rates of the 
secondary (industrial) sector in the second sub-period, that is, the period of internal market expansion. This is a significant finding, 
especially in conjunction with the clear tendency for small firms to list on the Exchange in the second and third decades of the 
twentieth century. The clear implication is that the Exchange became and remained an important venue for providing trading 
liquidity, and eventually finance, to emerging firms, until the outbreak of the Second World War. 
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Figure 3. Number of listings, number of IPOs, and total number of firms launched on the ASE, 1880–1940 
Source: Archival data from the files of the ASE and the National Bank of Greece, press reports and Exchange 
bulletins. 
Figure 4. Listings, 1880–1940: sectoral analysis during two sub-periods 
Source: See online app. S1. 
 
Table 1. Capitalization of listed shares and bonds on the ASE and number of securities for each asset 
category, 1880–1930 (calculated at the end of each decade) 
 
Year (end of 
decade, 31 
Dec.) 
Capitalizatio
n of 
government 
bonds (in 
gold 
No. of 
government 
bonds 
Capitalizatio
n of 
corporate 
bonds (in 
gold 
No. of 
corporate 
bonds 
Capitalizatio
n of shares 
(in gold 
sovereigns) 
No. of listing 
shares 
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name of each source, the year or range of years (presumably 1880 
to 1940?), and the name of the archive where you found it. 
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sovereigns) sovereigns) 
1880 6,775,925 8 1,577,042 1 3,379,715 10 
1890 16,882,709 7 2,981,906 1 5,938,114 13 
1900 26,697,662 9 3,112,514 12 4,924,628 20 
1910 20,611,488 12 5,941,822 14 12,207,369 27 
1920 18,510,309 18 5,356,224 18 20,216,870 45 
1930 71,819,308 33 2,483,051 18 17,926,594 101 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for governmental and corporate bonds on the ASE between 1880 and 1930.  
Source: Official Bulletins and Yearbooks of the Athens Stock Exchange (various years). 
Table 2. Comparative evolution of number of listed companies per million people 
 
              No. of listed companies per million people Stock market capitalization/GDP 
Country  1913 1929 1938 1913 1929 1938 
Argentina  15.29   0.17   
Australia  61.74 76.92 84.88 0.39 0.5 0.91 
Austria  38.72 42.62 30.06 0.76   
Belgium  108.7   0.99 1.31  
Brazil  12.43 9.85 5.17 0.25   
Canada  14.65   0.74  1.00 
Chile  20.62   0.17   
Cuba  12.69   2.19   
Denmark  38.22 54.86 85.25 0.36 0.17 0.25 
Egypt  16.58 13.44  1.09   
France  13.29  26.20 0.78  0.19 
Germany  27.96 19.73 10.91 0.44 0.35 0.18 
India 0.82 1.81 2.59 0.02 0.07 0.07 
Italy  6.32 6.40 3.11 0.17 0.23 0.26 
Japan  7.53 16.65 19.48 0.49 1.20 1.81 
Netherlands  65.87 95.48  0.56  0.74 
Norway  33.51 41.50 45.98 0.16 0.22 0.18 
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Russia  2.02   0.18   
South Africa     0.22a   
Spain     0.31a   
Sweden  20.64 16.36 14.93 0.47 0.41 0.30 
Switzerland  61.53 67.80 55.46 0.58   
Uruguaya  15.60a   0.16a   
UK  47.06   1.09 1.38 1.14 
US  4.75 9.72 9.16 0.39 0.75 0.56 
Greece 5.81 15.99 12.78 0.42 0.21 0.14 
       
Common law 
ave. a 
25.80   0.55   
German civil 
lawa 
33.94   0.73   
French civil 
lawa 
28.74   0.37   
Notes and sources: The number of listed companies per million people is the number of domestic companies whose equity is publicly 
traded in a domestic stock exchange divided by the population in millions. The data mainly come from Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great 
reversals’, tabs. 3 and 5 (pp. 15, 17), and complementarily  from Musacchio and Turner, ‘Law’, tab. 1 (noted with a). Musacchio and Turner 
(ibid., tab. 1, pp. 531–2) also introduce some stock market capitalization index numbers in 1913 for some countries that differ from the findings of 
Rajan and Zingales; in particular, for the UK the given stock market capitalization index is 0.98, for the US 0.39, for Switzerland 1.23, for Brazil 
0.20, for Cuba 0.33, for Egypt 0.44, for France 0.54, and for Denmark 0.86. O’Sullivan, ‘Expansion’, reports an average of 151 stocks traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1885, 296 in 1900, 429 in 1915, 670 in 1920, 775 in 1925, and 1,273 in 1930. The great majority of 
them were industrial shares (1,033 out of 1,273 in 1930). O’Sullivan also underlines that in addition to the 151 companies that were listed on the 
NYSE by 1885 there have been 249 firms listed on the Boston Stock Exchange and 79 in Philadelphia; ibid., p. 512. Further, Moody’s, Manual of 
industrials, app., p. 106, reported an aggregate market capitalization for the country’s leading trading markets of $81.97 billion at the end of 1930 
($49 billion for the NYSE; $20 billion for the Curb; and $13 billion for the remaining exchanges) which suggests a ratio of 91% based on a $90.4 
billion figure for GDP for 1930. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for listings and IPOs 
 
Simple listings IPOs 
Panel A: whole period, 1880–1940 
Variable Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
Given ownership 
(%) 
Mean 6.72 82,916 6 166,061 38 
Median 3.5 34,578 3 16,634 33 
No. of obs. 144 144 21 21 21 
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Panel B: sub-period, 1880–1913 
Variable Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
Given ownership 
(%) 
Mean 6.67 124,470 4 319,275  48 
Median 3 68,793 4 201,401  35 
No. of obs. 34 34 8 8 8 
Panel C: sub-period, 1914–40 
Variable Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
Given ownership 
(%) 
Mean 6.79 70,188 7 114,738 32 
Median 2.5 26,666 3 27,723 29 
No. of obs. 110 110 13 13 13 
Notes: This is a comparative table showing listings and IPOs. ‘Age’ is the age of the company in years from the date of its incorporation. 
‘Size’ measures the no. of newly issued shares offered to the public during the IPO procedure multiplied by their offer price in gold 
sovereigns. For simple listings it is the nominal share value in gold sovereigns. Panel A presents the statistics for the entire period. In 
panel B we concentrate on the period of rising globalization (1880–1913) during which growth was realized through listings and IPOs of 
larger firms, mainly orientated towards infrastructure and banking. Panel C provides statistics for the period of de-globalization (1914–
40), when the ASE developed an internal market orientation. 
Source: Data provided in online apps. S3 and S5. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for quasi-IPOs and IPOs 
Panel A: Comparison of quasi-IPOs with IPOs (whole period, 1880–1940) 
 Quasi-IPOs IPOs 
Variable 
quasi-IPOs 
Age (years)  Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
GO Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
Given 
ownership 
Mean 6.90 37,655 38.34 6 166,061 38 
Median 3 18,103 34.74 3 16,634 33 
Min. 0 542 0.63 1 1,697 6 
Max. 64 208,501 87.42 46 1,564,661 100 
       
No. of obs. 42 42 42 21 21 21 
Panel B: sub-period, 1880–1913 
 Quasi-IPOs IPOs 
Variable 
quasi-IPOs 
Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
GO Age (years)   Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
 Given 
ownership 
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Mean 12.71 81,263 48.26 4 319,275 48 
Median 3 72,927 49.12 4 201,401 35 
Min. 2 44,515 18.36 1 60,445 14 
Max. 64 131,181 75.13 11 827,109 100 
       
No. of obs. 6 6 6 8 8 8 
Panel C: sub-period, 1914–40 
 Quasi-IPOs IPOs 
Variable 
quasi-IPOs 
Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
GO Age (years) Size (gold 
sovereigns) 
 Given 
ownership 
Mean 5.74 30,387 33.18 7 114,738  32 
Median 3 16,111 31.71 3 27,723  29 
Min. 0 542 0.64 1 6,740  6 
Max. 48 208,501 87.42 46 1,066,666  63 
       
No. of obs. 37 37 37 13 13  13 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for quasi-IPOs compared to IPOs. Quasi-IPOs or ‘delayed’ IPOs are those cases of listings 
where firms performed a capital increase, offering sale of new shares for cash, within two years of the listing date. ‘Age’ is the age of the 
company in years since the listing date. ‘Size’ counts the no. of newly issued shares offered to the public during the IPO or the right 
offering procedure multiplied by their offer price in gold sovereigns. 
Source: Data provided in online apps. S4 and S5. 
Table 5. IPOs, first trading day IPO returns, size, and money left on the table, 1880–1940 
 
 
Perioda  No. of IPOsb,c Mean rate (%) of 
first trading day 
returns (RIR) 
Mean market (%) 
adjusted returnsd 
(MAIR) 
Size (funds raised, 
in gold sovereigns) 
Money left on the 
table (in gold 
sovereigns) 
1884 1 20 8.22 21,255 0 
1887 3 38.12 39.16 2,383,941 0 
1898 1 34.4 39.16 40,000 0 
1900 1 13.79 17.88 89,600 0 
1906 1 1.307 0.072 223,357 0 
1909 1 0.1 2.89 29,795 0 
25 
 
1917 1 30 26.64 8,943 2,682 
1918 1 7.69 0.107 50,363 3,872 
1925 7 331.42 301.89 77,636 282,299 
1926 2 45.45 42.22 5,530 2,680 
1927 1 160 156.29 7,997 12,795 
1930 1 52 75.57 537,115 279,300 
      
Sub-period, 
1880–1913 
8 20.15 22.49 2,787,948 0 
Sub-period, 
1914–40 
13 204.66 188.54 687,584 583,628 
Whole period, 
1880–1940 
21 119.01 108.34 3,475,532 583,628 
 
Notes: 
a No IPO took place in years not included in the table. 
b The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table was determined by the date of the firm’s entrance to the ASE, rather 
than the time of public offerings. 
c The IPOs only concern listings of common stocks on the Greek stock market. 
d The mean first trading day IPO returns adjusted with the returns of all other listed companies in the ASE. 
IPOs are included in the table. The offer price of IPOs is the price offered during the public offering procedure. First trading price is the 
first closing price of IPOs or listing on the ASE on the observed first trading day. Raw returns for IPOs are the difference between the offer 
(or listing) price and the closing price on the first day of trading and are equally weighted (EW). Market-adjusted returns are raw returns 
adjusted by the returns of matching portfolios. Funds raised and money left on the table are in gold sovereign prices. The amount of 
money left on the table by IPOs is defined as the difference (when positive) between the closing price on the first day and the listing price, 
multiplied by the number of shares sold to the public (new investors). In other words, this is the profit received by investors who were 
allocated IPO shares at the offer price, at first trading. It represents a wealth transfer from the shareholders of the issuing firm to these 
investors. 
Table 6. New listings on the ASE and economic growth 
 NLTL NLTL NLTL NLTL NLTL NLTL 
Panel A: whole period, 1880–1940 
Constant 0.0818*** 0.0830*** 0.0839*** 0.0862*** 0.0843*** 0.0882*** 
 (0.00004) (0.000081) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00003) 
GDPpc 0.000247 0.00002 0.00013    
 (0.712) (0.970) (0.875)    
DEV    0.0002* 0.000062 0.0002 
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    (0.0709) (0.734) (0.155) 
G1 0.0001   0.0002   
 (0.661)   (0.348)   
G2  0.0005**   0.0005**  
  (0.011)   (0.0354)  
G3   0.0001   0.0001 
   (0.392)   (0.211) 
       
Obs. 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Adj. R2 0.046 0.061 0.043 0.052 0.053 0.02 
Panel B: sub-period, 1880–1913 
Constant 0.0581 0.0576* 0.0587* 0.0981*** 0.0884*** 0.0986*** 
 (0.163) (0.0868) (0.0845) (0.00005) (0.00001) (0.000013) 
GDPpc    0.000350 0.000858 0.000202 
    (0.797) (0.637) (0.914) 
DEV 0.00544 0.00444 0.00528    
 (0.327) (0.325) (0.192)    
G1 0.00005   0.0007   
 (0.961)   (0.418)   
G2  0.00101   0.001  
  (0.508)   (0.362)  
G3   0.000098   0.0002 
   (0.923)   (0.866) 
       
Obs. 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Adj. R2 0.079 0.041 0.079 0.126 0.078 0.141 
Panel C: sub-period, 1914–40 
Constant 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.0696*** 0.0736*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00002) 
GDPpc 0.0009 0.0008 0.001    
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 (0.119) (0.203) (0.248)    
DEV    0.000162 0.000041 0.0001 
    (0.242) (0.828) (0.482) 
G1 0.000432   0.0005*   
 (0.142)   (0.072)   
G2  0.000431*   0.0005**  
  (0.079)   (0.048)  
G3   0.000064   0.0001* 
   (0.664)   (0.097) 
       
Obs. 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Adj. R2 0.060 0.024 0.032 0.050 0.042 0.052 
Notes: This table reports the results of multiple regressions using economic variables over the period 1884–1940 by employing the bootstrapping 
method. This constructs a number of resamples with replacement of the observed dataset. NLTL is new listings as % of total listings. GDPpc is the 
gross domestic product per capita. DEV is the devaluation rate. G1 is the growth rate of GDP. G2 is the rate of growth of the secondary sector 
(manufacturing). G3 is the rate of growth of the tertiary sector (services). ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
Table 7. Results of univariate regressions for IPOs, 1880–1940 
 
Variables MAIR MAIR MAIR 
Constant 0.854*** 551.30* 44.48 
 (0.000) (0.054) (0.598) 
Age 7.606   
 (0.31)   
Size  45.88*  
  (0.082)  
GO   0.29 
   (0.775) 
    
Obs. 21 21 21 
Adj. R2 0.129 0.249 0.008 
 
28 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of univariate regressions using the dataset of IPOs launched on the ASE in the 
period 1880–1940. The dependent variable is MAIR = (EPi,t  OPi,0)/OPi,0  MPRi, the IPO returns adjusted with the 
corresponding returns of all other listed companies on the ASE that traded on the relevant days. The independent 
variables are ‘Age’, defined as the log of one plus the age of the company in years on the listing date. ‘Size’ is the 
number of new issued shares offered to the public during the IPO, multiplied by their offer price (measured by the 
natural logarithm). GO identifies the % of ownership offered by listing firms to new shareholders in the IPO. The 
estimation results have employed the bootstrapping method. ***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% 
level. *Significant at the 10% level. 
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